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and explaining its import,34 must of necessity know the mystery of the
Name which we assume, in whose Name we act. It is not enough, if it
ever was, simply to repeat the tales of the Kingdom, or stories of the
presence of God. What is being offered to us in our foundational
scriptures is that those who stand with Christ, in that trembling
eschatological interstices we call the Church, need to leave the ground
while shouting out the threefold Qadosh of the angels. For the Name of
God demands that we enter into it in awe to experience its dynamis, not
stand on the sidelines of commentary like some post-modern paralytic,
waiting for someone to carry our pallet into the water.
! *
34 For Jesus gives his authority as a charism to his Church (Luke 4:6; Luke 4:32; Lk.
10:19) but will not share it with those who claim authority yet cannot demonstrate true
knowledge of the Name from their lives (Matt 9:6-8; Mk. 2.10; Lk. 5.24; See also-
Mt. 21.23- 27; Mk. 11.28;-33; Lk. 20. 2-8.)
Literacy, Orality, and the Brokerage of Power




The question of literary genre is closely connected with the line
of development of Christianity in general, and of the Egyptian desert
movement of the late antique period in particular. From different
Christian practices and experimentations with asceticism in the third and
fourth centuries of the common era emerge differing forms of expression
and articulation. In Egypt, for instance, there evolve-at least three
distinct genres that take different forms and yet are spurred by the very
same phenomenon of the practice of askesis and/or the encounter with
men and women who endeavor to coin and to improve on such ascetic
practices. One literary genre is the emerging elaboration of rules and
manuals regulating and governing the daily monastic activities; this
genre, albeit a later development in the Egyptian desert tradition, comes
to be very influential with the passage of time, particularly in the western
and the eastern churches. In this vein is the activity of Basil of Caesarea,
when he attempts to write the Shorter and the Longer Rules, and of many
others. The production of rules is furthermore strictly associated with the
construction of one particular - perhaps totalitarian in its character -
model of ascetic life, namely cenobism. This is the kind of genre which
will not be treated here but it will remain in the background as a
reminder of other possible developments articulating divergent forms of
not only literature, but also of actual ascetic practices.
Another example of an emergent literary genre from the desert
tradition is the life (Greek: bios; Latin: vita). This is most certainly not a
brand new genre in the late antique period for it draws heavily and is
largely conditioned by long-established ways of creating a narrative out
of peoples' lives and thereby preserving them for posterity. The genre of
vita in the Christian context nonetheless reveals certain aspects of the
Egyptian desert sub-culture that need to be explored. The writers of lives
are themselves representatives of the dominant (secular) culture that
infiltrates itself and bursts into the desert holy (wo)men by trying to
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appropriate and claim them for itself. These lives are the artifact of
spectators and on-lookers who have been profoundly impressed and
influenced by the desert's inhabitants. Despite the fact that the creation
of verbalized lives is a result of personal observation and contact with the
holy (wo)men, they remain portraits seen and drawn from one particular
angle and, moreover, with a particular bent toward the readers in the
center or the midst of late antique society, rather than for the ones located
at its fringes and on the borderlines of the desert frontier. A life is a
deliberate attempt to capture the spirit of the desert in words, to
encapsulate and transport it back into the main body of society (in
physical and cultural terms); yet, it presents itself to people who are
unacquainted with it and wish to emulate it. A vita both brings with it
the familiarity with the life in the Egyptian wilderness and at the same
time insinuates and presumes its own distance from it. Such a
fundamental contradiction is transparent for example when the authors of
lives tend to valorize the denigration of culture by desert ascetics, while,
at the same time, they themselves are resorting to and making full-blown
use of the heights of ancient culture.' For the purpose of illustrating this
specific genre and its significance in the formation of the 'Egyptian
desert' both as an actual and as a literary reality in the period of late
antiquity, and undeniably much beyond it, I will analyze some relevant
aspects from Athanasius's Vita Antonii and will try to contrast and
compare it to other lives available from that place and period.
Lastly, the third genre emerging from the unquenchable spirit of
the Egyptian desert - which perhaps of the three genres comes most
closely to the actual living persons that had engendered them all - is the
sayings of the desert fathers and mothers, known as Apophthegmata
Patrum. Although the composition and the constitution of these sayings
has been controverted and questioned, I will look at the genre as such,
rather than enter into a debate about different sayings and their reputed
veracity or lack thereof, and, besides, at the importance of this kind of
genre in the context of Egyptian society and of the desert movement. For
this purpose, I assume that the oral tradition - in contradistinction to the
written traditions, such as literary lives and rules, - arises strictly from
within the ascetic movement and fulfills certain roles that cannot be
completed by the presence of other literary forms. Furthermore, I also
assume that the oral tradition is not only primary, coming before the
articulation of alternative ways of inscription which avail with memory
and prefer the written letter, but also the dominant one within the sub
culture of the Egyptian desert.
Such is Anthony's dilemma in Vita Antonii. See below.
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So far, I have deliberately referred to the sub-culture of the
desert, for my argument follows the lines of proving the legitimacy and
the integrity of the Egyptian-Christian desert movement and addresses
the question of power and authority in the late antique period. Its
representatives and upholders, who are different in origin and
background, bring forth a new kind of culture, which is opposed to the
dominant one of secular society, as well as physically separate from it.
This alternative culture - which I have chosen to designate as 'sub
culture' so as to distinguish it from the mainstream of the dominant
culture - has not only a new provenance and perimeter (i.e. the physical
boundaries of the desert) but also its own ways of articulation or non-
articulation that make it distinct and separate. The designation 'sub
culture' should not however suggest that the culture of the desert is
somehow below the standards of the high secular culture. Quite on the
contrary, my attempt is to demonstrate that it epitomizes the very apex of
this (secular) culture, in whose periphery and in whose opposition it is
forming itself. In order to illustrate this, I shall make^use of Plato's
Phaedrus and, more specifically, Socrates' critique of writing as it is
relevant to the issues raised about genre and oral vs. written tradition
centered around the phenomenon of the Egyptian desert asceticism and
its forms of verbal expression in relation to the brokerage of religious
power and authority. Furthermore, Jacques Derrida and his particular
critique of totalistic linguistic models and frames of thinking and
expression will be referred to in order to cast a new light upon the
problematic of genre as it pertains to the society(ies) of Egypt in late
antiquity.
The Written Tradition: "Vita Antonii" or "Vita Athanasii"
Vita Antonii is a full-fledged narrative of Antony's life, or his
narrated bios, starting with his birth and childhood and ending with his
death; it is also prefaced by a self-referential explanation of the occasion
and the purpose of the vita and appended with an address to the
prospective readers. Athanasius makes an attempt to render Antony's
life within the framework of a narrative for he is aware of the impact that
Antony's (lived) life has had and projects a similar possibility of
Athanasius' (written) vita of Antony. The author is increasingly
conscious of the divergence occurring between the two - Antony's actual
life and Athanasius' pale and incomplete verbal rendition of it - and thus
frames his account within given self-acknowledged limits. Thus, he
starts Vita Antonii with a bashful excuse for the multiple imperfections of
his text largely to be blamed upon external and accidental contingencies:
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Well, when I received your letter I wanted to send for some of
the monks, especially those who used to associate with him most
closely. Thus I might have learned additional details and sent
you a fuller account. But the sailing season is about over and the
postman is growing impatient; therefore, I make haste to write to
Your Reverence what I myself know - for I have seen him often
- and whatever I was able to learn from him who was his
companion over a long period and poured water on his hands.2
Athanasius attributes the hastiness and the incompleteness of his work to
the fact that he is subject to a time constraint on the one hand and to the
pressure of the inquisitive brethren on the other. Perhaps he implies that
a perfect account, his being far from such, is possible, albeit it is not the
case in this particular instant because of trivialities and externalities, such
as time and season. At the very end of the narrative, Athanasius is
reminding the reader once again that "although this be but a meager
account as compared with the virtue of the man, yet do take this [narrated
vita] and reflect what manner of man Antony, the man of God, was."3 In
spite of these express qualifications in the very beginning and end of
Athanasius' vita, the author also states that a fuller and more accurate
picture of Antony's life can be derived from other supplemental sources,
such as people who come from the Egyptian desert and have extra-
information to share. Only when Athanasius' own inadequate and
insufficient by itself narrative is complemented by others' testimonies
could an account "be had that does approximate justice to him."4 For the
time being, that which can be communicated "by letter"5 and is supplied
by "only a few of the recollections 1 [Athanasius] have of him"6 is
presented before the reader to digest.
With a similar gesture, the author of The Lives of the Desert
Fathers prefaces the alphabetical collection of the vitae and is even
more explicit than Athanasius about his anxieties as an author. His
explanation and self-exculpation deserve an extensive quotation:
2 Athanasius, The Life ofSaint Antony, trans. Robert T. Meyer (New York- Newman
Press, 1978), 18.
^ Vita Antonii 93; The Life ofSaint Antony, 96.
* Vita Antonii, Prologue; The Life ofSaint Antony, 18.
^ Vita Antonii, Prologue; The Life ofSaint Antony, 17.
7 Vita Antonii, Prologue; The Life ofSaint Antony, 18.
Hisoria Monachorum in Aegypto, trans. Norman Russell (Oxford- Cistercian
Publications, 1981).
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I myself am not worthy to undertake such an exposition, because
it is not appropriate for humble men to treat of great themes.
Their powers are not equal to the task of explaining the truth in a
fitting manner, particularly when they presume to commit
themselves to writing and give inadequate expression to difficult
matters. Since we are of no account, it is too presumptuous and
dangerous for us to proceed to write on this most sublime theme.
Nevertheless, the pious community that lives on the holy Mount
of Olives has asked me repeatedly to write them an account of
the practices of the Egyptian monks which 1 have witnessed,
their fervent love and great ascetic discipline.8 (emphasis added)
The author-compiler of the alphabetical lives of the Egyptian desert
ascetics is a more self-conscious composer who hints at the problematic
lying in the background of Athanasius' own text but never explicitly
stated by himself. This author de facto is disclaiming any accurate truth
which might pertain to a written text, as such, not only a text laid out in
some constraint of time or any circumstantial pressures. What he
expresses in this paragraph is not only his own essential incapacity to
render into words the "sublime theme" but also his concession to
fundamentally question the capacity of narrative and "writing," as such,
to correctly and accurately present the "truth." Not only does he
acknowledge the fact that the verbal creation of vitae - as a
representation of a living reality - is a hubristic act on his part, but also a
danger. This danger resides precisely in his awareness of the many
shortcomings of verbal rendition with respect to its model, the real lives
of actual people. In spite of this intensified awareness, the author claims
exculpation through the mere benefit of such a text allowing for
imitation.9
Athanasius, although never admitting this readily of his own
accord but merely hinting at it, exemplifies in his text the gradual
transformation and appropriation of his hero, whom he professes to
narrate. The real Antony and Athanasius' narrated hero in Vita Antonii
come into an extremely complex relationship to each other and form an
amalgam which is sometimes impossible to decipher. The character
'Antony' changes significantly from the beginning of the narration till its
end and it is precisely the aspect of acculturation or Antony's attitude
toward 'letters' as part of culture that would be the focus of our interest.
8 The Life ofSaint Antony, 49.
9 In the Prologue, he states: "derive some profit from the edifying lives of these monks
through the imitation of their way of life" See The Life of Saint Antony, 49.
37
As Jacques Derrida notes the irreverent act on Plato's part with respect to
Socrates, whom he honors as his spiritual guide but nonetheless betrays
by writing "from out his [Socrates'] death,"10 so too it is perhaps
legitimate to accuse Athanasius, the descriptor of Antony's life, of
committing a patricidal act with respect to the latter. Indeed, Antony -
the very opponent of literary inscribing and even of speech itself -
becomes firmly inscribed and fixed in a text that has pinned Antony's
vita in the most rigid and letter-bound frame. From the upper left corner
of the painting (or the page) to its lower right corner Athanasius has
filled with utmost care and fore-thought all the contours and the colors so
as not to be able to recognize Antony himself but instead to discern an
entirely new inscription, the artifact of Athanasius' hand rather than
Antony's doings.
Antony is noted and (in)famous for his lack of formal education
for he has shunned the company of his peers from his early days and has
preferred to stay at home instead of attending school (kata to
gegrammenon)u The very identification of Antony as an "Egyptian by
birth"12 functions as a prelude to the institution of two textual categories
that operate in opposition to one another - Greek/pagan vs.
Egyptian/Christian. These two categories permeate the narrative and
provide a backdrop against which the evolution of Antony's life is
drawn. However, as 'Antony' himself evolves throughout the narrative,
so too these initially fixed categories shift. Athanasius' Antony starts off
as one who is thoroughly opposed to the Greek lettered and
philosophically-bent tradition. All he strives from the inception of his
conscious life is to lead a "simple life"13 (hos aplastos oikein en te oikia
autou)]4 and, as it were, to revert back to a sort of primal natural state of
both soul and body. He goes to secluded places in order to sever himself
from the normal run of life and be at one with nature; even wild animals
obey his command and are tamed by him.15 In consecutive steps, he
withdraws farther and farther from home-town and blood relations' for
the sake of achieving full detachment from them altogether. At the heart
10 Jacque Derrida, Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago- University of
Chicago Press, 1981), 148.
^ VitaAntonii 1; The Life ofSaint Antony, 18.
Vita Antonii 1; The Life ofSaint Antony, 18.
^ VitaAntonii 1; The Life ofSaint Antony, 18.
Vita Antonii 1. Note the curious and surely non-accidental use of "aplastos" meaning
'natural,' 'unaffected,' 'lacking molding' to designate the fact that Antony was
untouched and unspoiled by the surrounding culture. In a sense, he is born unto his age
and society, but remains outside of its scope of influence from his very early days
Vita Antonii 50; The Life ofSaint Antony, 63.
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of the desert and on the fringes of civilized society, he defies the limits of
humanity and of culture. He does not need any of the appurtenances of
culture, such as books for "he retained everything and so his memory
served him in place of books."16 He did not need even to carry the Bible
with him, since he had it inside him.
In one polemical statement against the 'Greeks' who have to "go
abroad and cross the sea to study letters" (perosin, hina grammata
mathosin),]1 Antony states that the (Egyptian) Christian possesses a
■ virtue inside the self (en hemin esti kai ex hemon synistatai).]S
Moreover, this state of virtue is associated with a primary state of the
Soul, referred to in the text as its "natural state" or "natural state as it was
created" (kata physin...hos ektisthe)}9 Antony continues by asserting
that the "task is not difficult: If we remain as we were made, we are in
the state of virtue" (ean gar meinomen hos gegonamen, en te arete
esmen).20 Therefore, it seems, this virtue is not only a part of the self, its
core, but also a fact of nature as opposed to the humanly constructed and
sustained culture together with all of its superfluities. The primal^tate is
only perverted by the intrusion of civilization and initial innocence is
thereby destroyed. Thus, in a dispute with 'Greek philosophers,' the
"unlettered" Antony (grammata me mathon)2] teaches the lettered
Greeks and forces them to concede that "mind" (nous) is of primary
importance for it is the inventor of "letters" (ton grammaton heureten),
which are only secondary and supplementary. Antony concludes that
"one who has a sound mind has no need of letters" (ho toinun ho nous
hygiainei, touto ouk anagkaia ta grammata)22; the latter in his view
present only a superfluity and a redundancy that have to be done away
with.
In another encounter with the imaginary opponent, Athanasius'
Antony unmasks the Greek penchant for logical proof and argumentation
as external and non-related to the essence of true faith. In a series of
rhetorical questions, he asks: "How does precise knowledge [gnosis] of
things come about, especially knowledge of God? Is it by verbal proof
[apodeixeos logon] or by an act of faith [energeias pisteos]1? And which
comes first, an active faith [energeias pistis] or verbal proof [logon
Vita Antonii 3; The Life ofSaint Antony, 21.
17 Vila Antonii 20; The Life ofSaint Antony, 37.
18 Vita Antonii 20; The Life ofSaint Antony, 37.
19 Vita Antonii 20; The Life ofSaint Antony, 37.
20 Vita Antonii 20; The Life ofSaint Antony, 37.
21 Vita Antonii 72; The Life ofSaint Antony, 80
Vita Antonii 73; The Life ofSaint Antony, 80.
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apodeixis]T23 These serious questions raised by Antony concerning the
accuracy of knowledge, as well as the aforementioned question
concerning letters and verbal reasoning (grammata and logoi) and their
relation to nous, once again point out the redundant and extraneous role
of logos both as word/discourse and as logical proof or verbalized
argumentation. Furthermore, Antony asserts that although faith has its
origin in the "soul" (psyche) and hence possesses some inherent
authenticity and genuineness for it is being in immediate proximity with
one's own center of being, dialectic is merely a technique, a "skill of
those who devise it" (dialektike apo technes ton suntithenton estin)24 and
just an art that can be mastered. The verdict of logos is undeniable:
Accordingly, those who are equipped with an active faith
[pisteos energeia] have no need of verbal argument, and
probably find it even superfluous [tacha kai peritte he dia logon
apodeixis]. For what we apprehend by faith, that you attempt to
construct by arguments [dia logon]; and often you cannot even
express what we perceive. The conclusion is that an active faith
is better and stronger than your sophistic arguments [ton
sophistikon humon sullogismon].25
Reason and verbal rationalization are downplayed for the sake of
underscoring "faith" which is based upon some alleged genealogy
whereby it "tangibly precedes any constructive reasoning of arguments
(ek ton logon kataskeuen)."26 Faith, understood in this manner, best
approaches and partakes of true knowledge, including knowledge about
God, whereas reason and verbal argumentation are secondary and
perhaps incidental to truth. The techne of the letter, as well as the artifice
of logos, is a masquerade that presents itself for a presumed reality and
truthfulness, yet, falls short of them. It is a skill, that properly belongs to
the body, to an external and superficial surface, whereas truth, faith,
virtue, divine presence belong to the soul, to the inner side of the person
and possess an integrity and inviolability denied to the 'letter' per se.
Hence, when Antony departs from this earthly life, it becomes self-
evident that his fame was not due to "his writings" (suggramaton), nor
"worldly wisdom" (exothen sophian), nor "any art" (tina technen) - but
pw?^'
27
23 VitaAntoniill; The Life ofSaint Antony, 83.
24 VitaAntoniill; The Life ofSaint Antony, 83.
25 VitaAntoni, 78; The Life ofSaint Antony, 84.
26 Vita Antonii 80; The Life ofSaint Antony, 85.
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instead "solely for his service to God" (thoesebeian).11 Ultimately, it is
his proximity and intimacy with God (theophilous autoupsyches esti)2i
as well as acts, rather than words, that matter and persist even after his
death. It is the lived life and not the inscribed vita that is the cherished
heritage for posterity.
In spite of presenting Antony as an adamant opponent of literary
inscription and the philosophical moorings of sophistry as aspects of
culture and as extraneous, if not noxious, to knowledge and truth,
Athanasius also molds 'Antony' to fit into the discourse of this very
culture that he [Antony] was trying to expose and unmask. Thus, when
at first Antony is portrayed as someone who shuns and flees more and
more his social milieu by going away from the inhabited regions inward
into the desert, then suddenly a drastic and unforeseen change occurs:
Antony seems to run away from society with all of its cultural trappings,
so as to become deeply entangled with it. The juncture at which this
significant transformation occurs is when Antony decides to leave his
solitude and to embrace the position of a teacher and 'father' o£monks.29
This reversal in his personality and vocation designates an important
shift that might indicate the place of Antony's re-claiming and
appropriation by Athanasius for the sake of the same culture and
civilization - with literacy at its height - that Antony abhorred and
avoided. Interestingly enough, this shift in Antony's career happens after
he has spent some time living in a "tomb" (mnemaf0 and in almost
absolute solitude in the desert of Pispir.31 Antony is literally forced to
come out by people who break down the door of his abode and compel
him to come out and be seen.32 At this point, Athanasius attributes to
Antony a new "charm in speaking" (charin de en to laleiri)33 that greatly
aids the needful for the impact (as well as the length) of his discourses is
impressive. The power of his speech extends to all kinds of people, both
learned and simple, and it meets all kinds of bodily and spiritual needs.
His words are indeed said to be "cures" (hos therapeian edechonto kai
tous logons ton gerontos)34 in themselves as they have the healing
capacity to help and to console.
30
Vita Antonii 93; The Life ofSaint Antony, 97.
Vita Antonii 93; The Life ofSaint Antony, 97.




Vita Antonii 14; The Life ofSaint Antony, 32.
Vita Antonii, 56; The Life ofSaint Antony, 68.
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Most importantly, the radical shift of Antony in Vita Antonii that
is followed by a number of prolonged and complex discourses signifies
the act of patricide on the part of Athanasius for it gives him an occasion
to re-paint his hero and to incorporate him back into the very fold that he
had already willingly left. This act allows Athanasius to state that, albeit
illiterate, Antony "wrote back" (antegrapsenf5 to emperor Constantine
in return to his letter, or, to have the right to encourage his monks to
"note and write down" (semeiometha kai grapsomerifb every movement
of the soul and the body, so as to expose one's failings and be ashamed
of them. It should, however, be noted that Antony does not respond to
the emperor without reserve. He remarks the insignificance of the letter
by a worldly monarch, and contrasts it to the fact that God "has written
the Law" (ton nomon anthropois egrapse) and, furthermore, "has spoken
to us through His own Son" (diet tou idiou huiou lelaleken hemin)?1
Thus, precedence is once again given to speech, albeit a concession to
writing is being made too.
Gradually but surely, the rustic and the unlettered Antony is
replaced and effaced by the new 'Antony' deeply immersed in
theological speculations, such as what is primary and secondary, and
entrenched in the traps of literariness. Athanasius depicts vita Antonii
and in this way decapitates Antony by transforming his life in conformity
with his own interests and purposes. Thus the inscription of Antony' vita
represents the decapitation of Antony and the betrayal of his [Antony's]
own personality. The narrative subsumes him under its cover and
transforms him into something utterly different, fixes him in a frame and
gives him a definite shape and contours via the strikes of the letters -
these same letters (or, shall we say fetters) that Antony so desperately
and arduously tried to resist and to flee.
The narrative tradition, and hence Athanasius' Vita Antonii as a
representative of this literary genre, demonstrates an act of
embezzlement of the desert ascetics by the highly lettered mainstream
culture. These radical figures, most of whom chose to remain orally-
inclined and minded,38 are re-incorporated in the folds of society by the
35 Vita Antonii, 81; The Life ofSaint Antony, 87.
36 Vita Antonii, 55; The Life ofSaint Antony, 67.
" V
y
ita Antonii, 81; 77ze Life ofSaint Antony, 87.
1 do not mean to overlook the fact that some of desert ascetics had a positive attitude
toward books and writing. There are accounts of books stolen from the habitat of the
desert ascetics, thus indicating that the possession of books was an actuality (Theodore of
Pherme, 29). Furthermore, there is a strain of positive valuation of books as a source of
knowledge for the sake of conducting a godly life (Epiphanius, 8). Also, there is
evidence for exchange and production of letters (Poemen, 90). However, these instances
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fact of narration, by the verbal and literary inscription on paper and by
the truncation of their lives into literary vitae. This act of violence via
engraving in letters committed against Antony: and his like in the
Egyptian desert betrays not only a claim of the charisma and power
generated by the acts of heroic lives of the holy (wo)men but also an act
of their willful transformation in the texture of the narration. These
narrated vitae not only purported to describe the lives of dead people
(both literally and metaphorically understood).39 Indeed, they executed
an act of decapitation of (the already dead) men and women inhabiting
the Egyptian desert and thereby appropriated them for the interests and
needs of the larger society. The means of this decapitation is the letter
and the form, or the memorial, represented by the literary vita. It was an
infiltration of dominant culture into the enclave of the desert that also
marked the decline and unfolding death of the ascetic endeavor per se
and a compensation for the living tradition that was far from satisfactory.
40The Oral Tradition: "Apophthegmata Patrum "
The sayings of the desert fathers and mothers consist of the
words of different people with diverse backgrounds and, yet, with similar
experiences and aspirations for the attainment of a perfect state in
compliance with the divine ordinances. All of them embarked on an
exodus in the desert of their own accord in order to seek self-
transcendence and to challenge themselves to overreach not only the
limits of their humanity but also these of their own culture. This attempt
for self-perfection and self-transcendence found an appropriate
remain the overwhelming minority. The prevailing attitude toward books and writing is
best illustrated by abba Arsenius, one of the most educated men of the Egyptian desert,
who upon a request as to why he visits an Egyptian peasant and consults him concerning
his own thoughts replies: "I have indeed been taught Latin and Greek, but I do not know
even the alphabet of this peasant" (Arsenius, 6). Similarly, when abba Antony is asked to
appraise the three answers given by three different disciples on a verse from Scripture, he
acclaims the one who has said: "I do not know" (Anthony, 17). It is thus the
apprehensiveness and reluctance to use books, as well as the Bible itself, that
characterizes the mood of the desert ascetics, rather than willingness to indulge in reading
and/or writing.
39 In Vita Antonii, Antony enjoins his followers to die daily, "to live as if we were to die
each day" (Vita Antonii, 19; The Life ofSaint Antony, 36). The ideal is to die completely,
both to the world and to the (old) self.
40 For the purposes of this paper, I will make use of the alphabetical edition of The




expression in one literary genre, most typical of the authentic desert
tradition- the oral sayings.
Despite the fact that we avail ourselves with the written version
of the actual sayings of the desert abbas and ammas, it must be noted
that the attitude of the desert practitioners (even) toward oral articulation
is especially ambiguous. On the one hand, speech is considered to be a
salutary means and, on the other hand, it is regarded as a baneful artifact.
For instance, letting out one's bothersome thoughts and problems can
function as a healing and a relief from an intense internal struggle.41
Also, the gift of speech may have the capacity of instituting a young
ascetic as an abba in the sight of his companions.42 It is noteworthy that
the uttered sayings of the desert ascetics are usually not general recipes
or panaceas for perfection and salvation of the human race. Instead, they
are concrete directions and pieces of advice meant for one particular
situation and a particular person, with a specific problem. The sayings
are tailored according to the needs and the stages of development that a
given person is currently undergoing. Although some of them have been
preserved without any detailed explanatory framework, they arise from
and remain deeply entrenched in given situational circumstances that
both bind them and give them effective power.43
Nonetheless, the desert ascetics are most poignantly aware of
and careful about the multiple traps of human speech, precisely because
of its ambiguity and the usual proclivity to slip from other-worldly talk to
this-worldly babble,44 as well as the capacity of speech to enter straight
into the inner parts of the speaker and/or hearer. Words are perceived as
something external and, very often, noxious that sneaks into the inner
courts of the human being and has an injurious effect upon it. Thus,
when one brother is grieved by his fellow, he realizes the fatal result of
its entry: "I prayed God to rid me of this word. So it became like blood in
my mouth and I have it spat out. Now 1 am in peace, have forgotten the
matter."45 Elsewhere in Apophthegmata Patrum, abba Tithoes responds
to the question "How should I guard my heart?" with another question
"How can we guard our hearts when our mouths and our stomachs are
46open?"4 The orifices of the human being, such as the mouth, the ear or
Poemen, 93; The Sayings ofthe Desert Fathers, 180.
42 Poemen, 60; The Sayings ofthe Desert Fathers, 175.
For instance, see the different instructions an abba gives to two different people in
accordance with their abilities and his perspicuous discernment of these. (Poemen, 22;
The Sayings ofthe Desert Fathers, 170).
Ammoes, 1; The Sayings ofthe Desert Fathers, 30.
45 Achilles, 4; The Sayings ofthe Desert Fathers, 29.
Tithoes, 3; The Sayings ofthe Desert Fathers, 236.
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the stomach, present a difficulty for they allow externalities, such as
words or food, to enter inside and sow their kind. The heart, or the
center of the human self, is vulnerable to any external and extraneous
stuff penetrating into the inside and thus directly impacting it.
In addition, calumny and any evil speech are likened to the
serpent's poison that "corrupts the soul of him who listens to him and he
does not save his own soul."47 Abba Hyperechius substantiates this
claim for the lethal effect of malevolent speech by the fact of the original
fall since "[i]t was through whispering that the serpent drove Eve out of
Paradise."48 Hence, it was speech and not anything else that' caused the
fall of humanity. Speech is not merely assigned the blame for the loss of
paradisical state; what is more, it breeds sins of its own: "No passion is
worse than an uncontrolled tongue, because it is the mother of all the
passions."49 Speech in its uncontrollability and unpredictability is an
obstacle to the attainment of perfection and to the acquisition of virtuous
life. Indeed, it is a villain that not only allows for the corruption of the
soul and the loss of the possibility for salvation, but- also permits
cannibalism: "It is better to eat meat and drink wine and not to eat the
flesh of one's brethren through slander."50
The only exit from the slipperiness of human speech that can
both uplift to heavenly heights and bring down to the abyss of the
netherworld51 is silence. In fact, exodus for some of the desert
inhabitants does stand for silence, and not merely for the physical
severing from civilization. The presence of people and the nuisance of
noise are in direct correlation and, hence, it is not surprising that the
exiles construe solitude and exodus as silence. Whereas one who "mixes
with the crowds constantly receives blows"52 in terms of disquieting the
internal peace and tranquility, one who isolates and withdraws into the
perimeter of the desert is able to achieve inner stability and calm. As one
of the abbas rightfully states that the via and modus vivendi of the holy
men are a constant and incessant journey - "For always I must wander,
in order to finish my course"53 - so too another concedes that the true
exodus is the constraint of speech: "If you cannot control your tongue,
you will not be an exile anywhere. Therefore control your tongue here,
47 Hyperechius, 5; The Sayings ofthe Desert Fathers, 238.
48 The Sayings ofthe Desert Fathers, 238.
49 Agathon, 1; The Sayings ofthe Desert Fathers, 20.
50 Hyperechius, 4; The Sayings ofthe Desert Fathers, 238.
51 Megethius, 4; The Sayings ofthe Desert Fathers, 150.
52 Nilus, 9; The Sayings ofthe Desert Fathers, 154.
53 Bessarion, 12; The Sayings ofthe Desert Fathers, 43.
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and you will be an exile."54 Macarius the Great, when questioned by one
of his brothers "Where could we flee beyond the desert?" puts his finger
on his lips and says: "Flee that," goes to his cell and shuts himself inside
it. The only possible pilgrimage through the desert and through the
world altogether is control of speech, best exemplified by the
maintenance of silence.
Silence is not only a preventive and a cathartic measure for the
attainment of inner peace and, ultimately, for ensuring salvation More
importantly, it signifies the divine presence and the human communion
with the deity in an unmediated and direct fashion. Whereas words in
their dangerous ambiguity and fluidity might "justify" or might
"condemn," silence is the guarantor of divine presence within the self
and, therefore, of its salvation. The solitary cell of the ascetic has a
special significance for it is the place where silence is made possible-
indeed, it is the teacher of silence. Abba Moses pronounces to someone
seeking his^word: "Go, sit in your cell and it will teach you
everything." By far, silence is the best instructor. The most important
aspect of this enclosed solitude is the resultant communion with the
Creator and the privileged position of the human beneficiary. One is
granted an intimacy and a close proximity to the divine, so that the abba
or the amma can converse with God, rather than with humans Thus
when one person praises abba John for his excellent work the latter
keeps quiet after the first two compliments and after the third utters-
"Since you came here, you have driven God away from me."59 Once
again, speech in this instance designates the distance from God, whereas
silence implies an intimate communion and immediate presence of the
divine. Abba Poemen confirms the realization of abba John in stating:
If the soul keeps far away from all discourse in word, from all
disorder and human disturbance, the Spirit of God will come in
to her and she who was barren will be fruitful.60
Consequently, silence is to be treasured and pursued not only as a
detachment from the harangue of mankind but also as a personal
" Longinus, 1; The Sayings ofthe Desert Fathers, 122
56 r?TiUS 'he GreC"' '6; The *&"& °f'he Deserl Fathers, 18.Cf. "Pilgrimage means that a man should control his own tongue" (Tithoes 2- The
Sayings ofthe Desert Fathers, 236).
jg Poemen, 42; The Sayings ofthe Desert Fathers, 173.
^ Moses, 6; The Sayings ofthe Desert Fathers, 139
m John the Dwarf, 32; The Sayings ofthe Desert Fathers, 92.
Poemen, 205; The Sayings ofthe Desert Fathers, 195.
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attachment to God and as a blessed state in the divine presence. Instead
of debasing themselves in speaking to (wo)men, the angelic ascetics
elevate themselves and converse with God.61
In spite of the preferred communion with God to communication
with other human beings and, perhaps, due to this direct contact with the
divine, the holy inhabitants of the desert are constantly asked to dispense
'a word/saying' for the sake of fellow Christians. There is some urgency
and pressing necessity in the usual address to the abba or amma 'Give
me a word! What should I do to be saved?' One of the supplicants even
states: "Speak a word to me for I am perishing."62 In such an emergency
situation, when one is struggling for the certainty of salvation and the
evasion of death, any 'word' or 'saying' per se would be inadequate and
insufficient in itself. The answer to this plea, thus, is: "I myself am in
danger, so what can I say to you?"63 Albeit asking for 'a word' on part
of their spiritual superiors, the questioners are essentially asking for an
indication of what to do in order to obtain the much desired salvation.
Instruction in words, however, is only an attribute to those^who have
achieved an advancement in their perfection and can offer the fruit of
practical experience rather than mere theoretical knowledge.
Instructing one's neighbor is for the man who is whole and
without passions; for what is the use of building the house of
another, while destroying one's own?64
In order to teach, one has to possess an integrity and to be able to edify
through words, as well as through acts. Hence, when asked for 'a word'
abba Or answers: "Go, and what you have seen me do, do also."65 Then,
silence ensues.
What is striking about this persistent request for 'a word/saying'
is that it is not only intricately connected to the question of salvation and
to concrete directions for modus vivendi, but it is furthermore always
distinguished from the plural 'words' understood as human discourse and
distraction from God as well as dissipation of the soul. Request for a
word and the factuality of worldly words differ significantly and in this
difference resides the key to unlock the complex attitude of the desert
fathers and mothers to verbal articulation and speech. As silence is
Pambo, 7; The Sayings ofthe Desert Fathers, 197.
Theodore ofPherme, 20; The Sayings ofthe Desert Fathers, 76.
3 Theodore ofPherme, 20; The Sayings ofthe Desert Fathers, 76.
Poemen, 127; The Sayings ofthe Desert Fathers, 185.
65 Or, 7; The Sayings ofthe Desert Fathers, 247.
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integrally related to the divine presence, so the singularity of word- as
opposed to words - is associated with being, with acts of life rather than
with any abstraction. The decomposition and dispersal of word into
wordy m this case designates the disintegration of the direct link to God
and the denial of human perfectability derived from it. The main
concern of the desert ascetics however is not to 'word' but to 'be' or
more precisely, to 'become.'
The prohibition of teaching in words without exemplifying in
acts is due to the perception of a necessary harmony between and
coincidence of 'word' and 'being,'66 or acts of life. Therefore the best
way to teach is through demonstration and personal example, instead of
reading books or listening to discourses. Accumulation of books in the
desert is branded not only as superfluous but also as sinful as it is a
worldly possession that can potentially generate income for the needful67
Commentary on the Scriptures is sometimes undertaken, but is preferably
not to be expounded upon. One is praised highly when restraining from
pronouncement on Scripture68 for such an endeavor forebodes a potential
danger. When asked whether to comment on "Scripture" or on the
"sayings of the Fathers," abba Amoun responds that "you had better talk
about the sayings of the Fathers than about the Scriptures; it is not so
dangerous."
Speech and any verbal utterance, as much as they cannot be
avoided, must be in compliance with one's via, or manner of life
Indeed, the 'word' and the whole being and life-style of the ascetic must
coincide and form one integral whole. The desert ascetic must become a
word, must become a sign70 to be read and to be studied by the rest so as
to be copied and imitated. What the holy (wo)man strives for is to
become a lucid sign sufficient in itself to be recognized and to be legible
for others. Any other articulation of their lives is a compromise and a
fall from the lofty height s/he aspires to. Thus, it is not solely the
n '" C0"TCtin8 '^°rd' and 'being'' rather than 'word' and 'event,' as does DouglasButon Christie, The Word in the Desert (New York: Oxford University Press 1993) 18-
19, 77. 1 would like to distinguish my approach from his. Burton-Christie borrows this
idea from the two meanings of the Hebrew word 'dabar' as expounded by Walter One in
Urality and Literacy: The Technologizing ofthe Word (London: Methuen) 1985 31 Theclose association of'word' and 'event' betrays a latent Hebraism, which I consider '
inappropriate in the context of the Egyptian desert tradition and would like to avoid for
reasons that will become obvious in the course of this paper.
^ Serapion, 2; The Sayings ofthe Desert Fathers, 227.
^ Poemen, 8; The Sayings ofthe Desert Fathers, 167.
7o Amoun ofNitria, 2; The Sayings ofthe Desert Fathers 32
On this issue, Geoffrey Harpham concurs. See The Ascetic Imperative in Culture and
Criticism (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987), 16
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avoidance of the multiplicity of words - understood as the worldly noise
- that the desert ascetics are after but, more importantly, the avoidance of
any verbal articulation of 'a word' to a seeking soul. The ideal is to do
away with the superfluity of word(s) and to become one instead. This
new (wo)man-become-word or (wo)man-become-sign will be as a
signpost designating and embodying the proper way of being-in-this-
world, as well as edifying. Quite understandably, abba Poemen enjoins a
younger companion: "be their example, not their legislator."71 The goal
is not as much to realize a given text in life,72 as much as it is to become
an autonomous text perfectly legible and transparent to the rest; to be a
text that does not need any explanation or any supplemental texts or
words in order to communicate itself in a coherent and intelligible
manner and to instruct most successfully and fruitfully.
' Plato: "Phaedrus " and the Critique of Writing
Plato's Phaedrus, and in particular its second part, jjrovides a
critique of writing unfolded throughout the dialogue between Socrates
and Phaedrus. It has many points of commonality with the critique of
textual and verbal inscription launched by the desert holy (wo)men and
thus is especially pertinent for an examination of the problematic of
literary production in both oral and written forms. In it Socrates is lured
by Phaedrus to go out of the city of Athens in order to be able to hear a
written speech that Phaedrus holds in his hands. Socrates admits the
unusual temporary 'exodus' from the city that he explains in the
following way:
I am devoted to learning; landscapes and trees have nothing to
teach me - only the people in the city can do that. But you, I
think, have found a potion to charm me into leaving [dokeis moi
tes ernes exocou to pharmakon heurekenai].13
The word used here for "potion" is pharmakon, which in the Greek
might have a range of meanings, such as "medical drug, a poison, or a
magical potion." This term is important for, later in the text, it comes
to designate writing and its dubious effect on people. The written speech
72
Poemen, 174; Sayings ofthe Desert Fathers, 191.
Burton-Christie refers to an "appropriation" of text, more specifically of the Scriptures.
See The Word in the Desert, 153-4.
Phaedrus 230D, trans. Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff ( Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Company, 1995), 6.
74 See Phaedrus, 79; footnote 181.
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of Lysias, being held in the hands of Phaedrus, thus engenders a
conversation on the aptness and ineptitude of human discourse in
general, both in its oral and written form.
The critique of human discourse is twofold - first it is exercised
on rhetoric as the art of oral persuasion, and only then on verbal
inscription of spoken discourse. The engagement with rhetoric is to
determine whether and when it is an "art" (techne) and an "artless
practice {atechnos tribe).1' Socrates, the mouthpiece of Plato, claims
that rhetorical art is first and foremost psychagogia, or guiding of the
soul, via the means of speech.76 The distinction between artful and
artless rhetoric resides in the discernment of truth and the possession of
genuine knowledge. The art of one who has no grasp of truth is no art
whatsoever but a "ridiculous thing."77 The true rhetorician is a
dialectician indeed and any other version of the art of persuasion is a
parody and a sham.
Socrates charges alleged rhetoricians with twisting and
misrepresenting truth, if they ever happen to be conscious of it for they
not only attempt to please the base tastes of the crowd, but also stick
pathetically to the principle of eikos, the 'likely,' as opposed to aletheia,
or truth itself. Such dilettantes are capable of making "small things
appear great and great appear small."79 Their art, or pretense thereof is
not invested m the pursuit of truth: "They only care about what' is
convincing. This ,s called 'the likely' [eikos]... Whatever you say you
should pursue what is likely and leave the truth aside," especially when
reality does not 'seem' to approximate what is 'likely,' or eikos"0 In
Socrates' view, similar practitioners of rhetoric, which is usually
acquired through "courses and handbooks,"81 cannot be regarded as
serious for they know the "preliminaries" of the art but not the art itself.82
On account of their dilettantism and artlessness they are blameworthy
and well deserving of poignant critique.83
The alternative proposed by Socrates is that of dialectics In
order to be an authentic rhetorician, one needs to be an experienced
75 Phaedrus 260E.






83 See the analogy with a doctor who has read books and has knowledge of a few notions
yet, remains a laughable impostor. See Phaedrus 268C.
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reader of souls and knower of speeches. He parallels the method of
rhetoric with that of medicine for the former is concerned with impacting
the soul in a salutary way, whereas the latter with the body.84 The
orator/diagnostician has to determine the nature of the object he is
intending to treat so as to prescribe the correct dosage and ingredients of
the speech/pharmakon.S5 Not only is it necessary to investigate the
power, nature, forms and effects of a discourse upon the human soul, but
it is also important to study the nature of soul, its kinds and
characteristics, in order to be able to match the appropriate speech for a
given soul so as to be efficacious.86 A system of classification of souls
and speeches is needed in order to develop an explanatory apparatus for
the complex workings of speech upon the human soul, to understand the
interaction between the speech and the soul and to account for any
successes or failures of the art of persuasion. It is a scientification of
rhetorical art and its subordination to a rationale. Most importantly, the
practitioner of this art must know the precise kairos for both speaking
and being silent.87 Only then is one a true master of the art.
Socrates concludes that the practice of the rhetorical art is an
arduous business that involves lengthy and troublesome studies before
one could fully understand and be able to coordinate speeches and
human souls in the correct manner. He states that the pursuit of this
difficult art is never done for the sake of fellow humans but instead "to
be able to speak and act in a way that pleases the gods as much as
possible."88 The question of the possibility of achieving such level of
proficiency, however, remains open.
The second part of Socrates' twofold critique involves writing
per se. The starting point for his launching of an attack on writing is a
purportedly ancient myth of the origination of the art of writing.
Socrates relates that the father of writing is an Egyptian god by the name
of Thoth, who also invented the numbers, arithmetic, geometry,
astronomy, and others.89 The correct appraisal of this new skill,
however, comes not from the father of writing himself, who like all
84 Phaedrus 270.
Please note that pharmakon is not a word that Plato uses in reference to spoken
discourse but only to written speech or to writing. However, from his analogy between
medicine and rhetoric, this can be easily inferred to refer to oral discourse too. Hence,
my liberty to make use of it in this context.
86 Phaedrus 271. It is noteworthy that Athanasius also likens Antony to a "physician" of





parents » partial and deluded about the actual significance of his
offspring, but instead from the king-god Thamus, or Ammon. Whereas
the former declares: "O, King, here is something that, once learned will
make the Egyptians wiser and will improve their memory I have
discovered a^potion [pharmakon] for memory {mneme} and'wisdom
[sophia], the latter responds harshly, as follows:
And now, since you are the father of writing \pater on
grammaton], your affection for it has made you describe its
effects as opposite [tounantion] of what they really are In fact
it will introduce forgetfulness into the soul of those who learn if'
they will not practice using their memory because they will put
their trust in writing, which is external and depends on signs that
belong to others [dia pistin graphes exothen hup' allotrion
tupon], instead of trying to remember from the inside
completely on their own [ouk endothen autous huph' h^ulo~n
anamimneskomenous}. You have not discovered a potion for
remembering, but for reminding [oukoun mnemes alia
hupomneseos, pharmakon heures}; you provide your students
with the appearance of wisdom [doxan], not with its reality
[aletheian]. (emphasis added)
This statement is very telling for the critique of writing is directed
precisely against what it presumes or claims to be. Writing is unmasked
by the king-god as a pretense and a sham art presenting itself for the sake
of accumulation of knowledge and, yet, working against human memory
and wisdom It is precisely the opposite of what it presents itself to be
The king-god perceives danger of such an invention and plainly states
[Writing] will enable them to hear many things without being
properly taught, and they will imagine that they have come to
know much while for the most part they will know nothing. And
they will be difficult to get along with, since they will merely






Thus, the two major attacks launched against writing are firstly its
externality to the human being and, thus, its ineffectiveness as a tool for
mneme, and secondly its subversion. As the king asserts, writing is a
system of signification that can only serve as an 'aide-memoire,'' as a
hypomnesis or a reminding, an anterior propping to lean on. Its function
as hypomnesis rather than mneme, which is an internal working of the
mind, is in accordance with its being an external sign or memorial. Not
only is writing blameworthy for its radically estranged position from the
movements of the human soul, but it is furthermore charged with
appearance rather than truthfulness. Its re-presentation is its
misrepresentation. This charge against literary inscription parallels
Plato's critique of the poets in the Republic where he decides to exclude
the poets from the mental construction of the perfect city because of their
being thrice-distanced from the truth, i.e. because their work mimics and
represents inaccurately the original whose copy it is.93 An inherent
extraneousness, a superfluity and, even, a danger are that which
characterizes the art of writing, being jettisoned uncompromisingly as
merely a hypomnesis, as outward "reminders to those who already
know."94
Furthermore, Socrates remarks that any piece of writing, when
left to itself, is insufficient for it always needs the defense and the
support of its "father";95 alone, it is entirely helpless and fully dependent.
Lastly, any written words possess no control over their fate for they
wander far away in their promiscuity and without regard of whether the
reader has an understanding or not.96 Ultimately, a written discourse, as
well as a painting, "remains solemnly silent" and needs the living voice
of its composer in order to arrive at lucid comprehension and eventual
effectiveness.97
The alternative to writing in letters proposed by Socrates is a
writing "in the soul" of a person.98 Thus, the ideal is explicated, as
follows:
Socrates: It is a discourse that is written down, with knowledge,
in the soul of the listener; it can defend itself, and it











Phaedrus: You mean the living, breathing discourse of the man
who knows, of which the written one can be fairly called
an image [eidolon].
Jacques Derrida: The Critique ofPlatonism
99Socrates: Absolutely right.
The inscription in the soul is living and real, whereas the inscription in
letters is a demarcation of death and perversion of human discourse
While the former preserves the integrity and the wholeness of the
speaker, the latter turns against its own father, or mother, and against its
recipient in that it is a monstrous weakling - or, more strongly put an
illegitimate child. Socrates states explicitly that writing as an act of
sowing a seed (the seed of discourse)100 is fruitful only when it is
inscribed in the soul of a person, for only in this case can it be "clear
perfect, and worth serious attention."101 Thus, the legitimate offspring of
a rhetor is the soul's inscription with words that, on their part, breed their
own offspring or siblings:
Such discourses should be called his own legitimate children
first the discourse he may have discovered within himself and
then its sons and brothers who may have grown naturally in
other souls insofar as these are worthy...m
It must be noted, however, that psychic writing remains a metaphor used
by Socrates to put forth his point rather than re-institute and rehabilitate
writing as such. He does not propose two kinds of writing, one bad and
one good, but rather contrasts logos which is internal, alive and authentic
to its material and outward inscription, which is frozen and petrified on
the page. Hence, it is once again the phone or the spoken logos which






Jacques Derrida in his essay "Plato's Pharmacy" provides an
alternative and insightful reading to the classical reading of Plato's
critique of writing and thus goes against the grain of the text in order to
dismantle and debunk a whole system of construing writing. Derrida
uses Plato's text against Platonism, interrogates Plato before his own
tribunal, and unveils the different strata of inherent metaphysics
underlying his system of writing and his framework of thought. In so
doing, he unmasks the tyranny of a metaphysics concerned with
logocentrism, which Derrida understands strictly as phonocentrism, with
presence {to on), with being (ousia) and with truth (aletheia). This
edifice of western metaphysical undertakings that holds a sway since
Plato is a cultural dictum that Derrida wants to surpass and to supplant.
In so doing, he strives to go beyond the simple binary oppositions of the
decadence and fall of writing over against a spontaneity and splendor of
living speech, the sham of re-presentation as an absence over .against an
irreplaceable presence, the multiplicity of copies over against an
irreducible truth. These are namely the cultural imperatives of the west
deeply entrenched in a pervasive binarism of opposites104 that Derrida
revolts against and investigates 'Plato's pharmacy' for a resolution.
Indeed, this deconstructive reading is not merely an interrogation but a
rending of the facade of dialectics or rhetoric and, thereby, exposing the
(otherwise hidden and hiding) construction of ontology or theology - the
shameless and merciless undressing of Platonism to its very nakedness.
In commenting on Plato's myth on the origin of writing, Derrida
notes the fact that although the father of this new techne is Thoth, he
remains in the background of the story as merely a "technocrat without
the power of decision, an engineer, a clever, ingenious servant"105 in
contrast to the supreme king-god, who is the other father-figure, this time
of logos or living speech. The king-father is the blinding and dazzling
sun, the origin of all being (ta onto) and of the logos. The father of the
103 First published in Tel Quel, Nos 32 and 33, 1968. My citations are provided from its
reprint in the volume Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1981), 61-171.
04 Derrida is interested not as much in the borrowed myth of origins for writing, as much
as in the underlying structure: "Plato had to make his tale conform to structural laws. The
most general of these, those that govern and articulate the oppositions speech/writing,
life/death, father/son, master/servant, first/second, legitimate son/orphan-bastard,
soul/body, inside/outside, good/evil, seriousness/play, day/night, sun/moon, etc."
Dissemination, 85.
105 Derrida, Dissemination, 86.
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logos is thus in no need of writing and condemns it for its essential
uselessness and menace.
God the king does not know how to write, but that ignorance or
incapacity only testifies to his sovereign independence He has
no need to write. He speaks, he says, he dictates, and his word
suffices.
The logos, whose origin is the father, implies the presence of its own
progenitor. It cannot exist independently and of itself for it needs the
father to be what it is, a living discourse. When the father is no longer
present, logos degenerates into writing and, furthermore, becomes a
criminal for it commits a patricidal act. Therefore, "[t]he specificity of
writing would thus be intimately bound to the absence of the father"107
Dernda does not look at the status of writing in a simplistic and
straightforward way, for he affirms the ambiguity of a pitiable orphan-
son and a guilty parricidal son that constitutes the concept of writing As
a result of his hubris, the son turns into a kind of a bastard-child that
forgets its origin and strays away wandering indiscriminately in all
directions. The miserable orphan, as well as writing of which it is a
symbol,
being nobody's son at the instant it reaches inscription, scarcely
remains a son at all and no longer recognizes its origins, whether
legally or morally. In contrast to writing, living logos is alive in
that it has a father (whereas the orphan is already half dead), a
father that is present, standing near it, behind it, within 'it
sustaining it with his rectitude, attending it in person in his own
name.
The key phrase in this comparison of the legitimate and illegitimate sons
of speech and writing, is the fact that literary inscription is "half dead"
that it is not a corpse but something between a living and a dead body
This position on the borderline of two opposing categories is best
captured by the duplicity and fluidity of a term that Plato himself uses to
refer to writing - pharmakon.
The case of writing is a grave one, but not a simple one The





facetedness. Pharmakon as writing, or writing as pharmakon, cannot be
classified in one category only, such as bad or good, noxious or
innocuous, baneful or salutary, external or internal. It encompasses all of
these opposites and is these opposite categories at the same time. In its
ambiguous and changeable nature, the drug, albeit originally coming
' from without, can penetrate the inner of the human body and act as a
cure as well as a poison. It can both vivify and mortify. It can have
these opposite effects on the body depending on its measure and its
manner of application. Thus, writing, albeit a degenerate art, can have
unpredictable and harmful effects upon the human soul by penetrating it
and making it forgetful (letheri) rather than endowing it with superior
memory and wisdom.109 The antidote to it is knowledge (episteme) for
only the one who knows its ambivalence and danger is able to handle it
correctly.
Most importantly, Derrida demonstrates that Plato presents
writing not as pertaining to a series of binary opposites but rather as
constituting itself a contradictory and complex phenomenon- which
cannot be easily regarded under the rubric of oppositions (the latter being
an instance of Platonism's totalitarian grip over western philosophical
tradition). The power, or the malice, of this magic 'potion' of writing is
that it is neither one opposite of the spectrum, nor the other, but both at
the same time. It is neither, nor; both, and. It possesses the powers of
good and evil, and it changes poles in the moment of a blink. To reduce
it to any single thing will be a grave mistake and unpardonable
ignorance."0 Notwithstanding, the condemnation of writing as
pharmakon is not that it is maleficent or fraught with mutability and
ambivalence. Rather, the charge is that the living "logos is a more
effective pharmakon"[U that immediately penetrates and impacts the
inner courts of the soul. It thus does not have the differance of the
writing, as coined by Derrida to capture both the difference and the
distance (derived from 'differ' and 'defer') involved in its operation. Of
course, by the dint of some divine irony, logos is both pharmakon but
In commenting on the effects of writing on memory, Derrida writes: "Letting itself
[memory] be stoned [medusee] by its own signs, its own guardians, by the types
committed to the keeping and surveillance of knowledge, it will sink into lethe, overcome
by non-knowledge, and forgetfulness. Memory and truth cannot be separated. The
movement of aletheia is a deployment of mneme through and through." (Dissemination,
105)
See Derrida's critique of the reduction ofpharmakon, or writing, to only one
signification, namely negative or positive alone, as mistaken. Cf. Dissemination, 99,
especially 103-4.
Derrida, Dissemination, 1 15.
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also the antidote, alexipharmakon; it is that which opposes its own
opposite. It both infects and then offers catharsis. All of this is
possible because of the duplicity ofpharmakon and its lack of essence or
stability:
If the pharmakon is 'ambivalent,' it is because it constitutes a
medium in which opposites are opposed, the movement and the
play that links them among themselves, reverses them or makes
one side cross over into the other (soul/body, good/evil,
inside/outside, memory/forgetfulness, speech/writing, etc.). It is
on the basis of this play or movement that the opposites or
differences are stopped by Plato. The pharmakon is the
movement the locus, and the play: (the production of)
difference. 3
At this juncture Derrida surpasses classical understanding of Platonism
and offers an alternative to it. This alternative overcomes the imposition
of binary oppositions, of the tyranny of ontology"4 in the history of
western metaphysics that has so unjustly relegated writing to a
secondary, derivative, and inferior position to that of living discourse
The secrets of Plato's pharmacy are divulged by the gracious skill and
the careful anatomy of the pharmakeus Derrida so as to demonstrate the
emancipation from the chains of 'Platonism' and the overcoming of
binansm. Derrida speaks best for himself:
[T]he disappearance of the god-father-capital-sun is thus the
precondition for discourse, taken this time as a moment and not
as a principle of generalized writing. That writing (is) epekeina
tes ousias [beyond beingness or presence]. The disappearance of
truth as presence, the withdrawal of the present origin of
presence, is the condition of all (manifestations of) truth.
Nontruth is the truth. Nonpresence is the presence. Differance,
the disappearance of any originary presence, is at once the
condition of possibility and the condition of impossibility of
truth, (emphasis original)
112 Derrida, Dissemination, 124.
Derrida, Dissemination, 127.
''" By the principle of ontology pervading any discipline in the west, Derrida means the




The ascetics inhabiting the Egyptian desert may have never read
Plato."6 Certainly, they could not have read Derrida either or even
anticipated his onslaught on Platonism. However, they embodied and
lived to a large extent what both Plato and Derrida write about. The holy
(wo)men experienced most profoundly and categorically the ambiguity
of logos, both in its written and oral forms, as pharmakon or as a
potentially salutary and dangerous medium whose ambivalence had to be
circumvented at all cost. Furthermore, in transcending their own selves -
by becoming an angelic other - and their respective culture via the
coinage of an alternative one, the desert ascetics overturned the existing
metaphysical and physical propping of their own society. In their deeds
and being, they overcame the dominion of cultural oppositions, such as
matter/spirit, body/soul, terrestrial/celestial, speech/writing, and towered
high above' these. They incorporated in themselves and in their lives
these contradictory extremes and, somehow, managed to reconcile them
by making it possible for them to cohabit. Hence, it is not in the least
surprising that amma Sarah captures this metamorphosis in the following
way:
She also said to the brothers, 'It is I who am a man, you who are
women. 117
Or, that the black abba Moses is qualified in this manner:
'Moses, now you are entirely white.' 118
This subversion which, at the same time, is a coincidence of opposites
via their transcendence is precisely what the desert ascetics achieved de
jure and de facto. An overcoming of binarism whereby the two
(otherwise mutually exclusive) opposites come to coexist in intimate
proximity and, indeed, become non-distinguishable from each other. A
mark, and its effacement.
116 It should be remarked that some of the desert ascetics are indicated to be highly




Sarah 9; Sayings ofthe Desert Fathers, 230.
Moses 4; Sayings ofthe Desert Fathers, 139.
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